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Abstract 
This paper examines how conservation decisions are affected by environmental degradation. 
Donations to an environmental NGO and participation in actual conservation activities 
capture individual preferences for environmental conservation. Environmental degradation is 
measured both through survey-based data on experiences of deforestation and environmental 
shocks, and through indices of deforestation constructed with GIS data. The results show that 
being exposed to environmental degradation is correlated both with higher donations and 
conservation behavior. The relationship between conservation choices and individual social 
preferences is also explored. Experimental measures of individual altruism and inequality 
aversion, and survey measures of trust, time preferences and civic engagement are correlated 
with donations and real world conservation decisions respectively. These findings show the 
role of environmental awareness in fostering environmental conservation even in very poor 
settings. They also highlight the potential of experiments, which closely mirror real world 
decisions, to generate conclusions generalizable to individual behavior outside the laboratory. 
 
JEL Classifications: C71, C93, O12, O20, Q20
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1. Introduction 
Promoting sustainable use of natural resources is one of the main challenges facing 
policy makers in developed and developing countries alike (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2005; TEEB, 2010). While developed countries adopt laws and sanctions 
to regulate the use of common property resources (henceforth CPR), developing 
countries often lack the institutional capacity to design and enforce the complex 
measures to address environmental problems (Dietz et al., 2003). Sustainable 
management of natural resources in poor countries often relies on informal systems 
managed by users themselves (Wade, 1987). Given the role of collective action in 
promoting sustainable resource use in these settings, understanding what influences 
environmental valuation and generates support for locally owned solutions is a 
priority both for policy makers and researchers (Agrawal, 2001; Gibson et al., 2005). 
Research on these issues can have a large impact on development and poverty 
reduction. The negative consequences of environmental degradation are likely to be 
more severely felt in poor countries (Stern, 2006; Mendelsohn et al., 2006). Heavier 
reliance on fresh water, pastures, and forests, for example, results in greater 
vulnerability to environmental shocks, such as flooding, droughts and soil erosion 
(Morton, 2007). Research shows how environmental degradation in general, and 
deforestation in particular, affect those who rely on natural resources for their 
livelihoods (Bucknall et al., 2000). Such negative effects are stronger among more 
vulnerable family members, such as children (Nankhuni & Findeis, 2004). Long 
firewood collection time may also expose the female population of a developing 
country to danger in conflict zones (Bizzarri, 2009). 
This paper examines factors associated with individuals’ choices to contribute to 
environmental conservation in rural Sierra Leone. We focus on two potential 
correlates of conservation behavior: social preferences and exposure to environmental 
degradation. First, through an artefactual field experiment (Harrison & List, 2004), 
which closely mirrors actual conservation decisions faced by participants in their daily 
lives, and survey measures of actual conservation behavior, we analyze the 
relationship between environmental conservation and other types of social 
preferences, measured using experimental and survey data. Second, we examine the 
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correlation between conservation choices and indices of environmental degradation, 
both collected through survey questions and constructed from GIS deforestation data.  
Conservation behavior is defined here as the preservation and management of the 
environment and common natural resources. Consequently, our dependent variables - 
donations to a conservation NGO, participation in town cleaning and maintenance of 
the village’s water sources - capture actual conservation behavior. Participants to the 
experiment decide how much to donate to a local NGO conducting environmental 
education and conservation campaigns in the country. We complement this 
experimental measure with survey data on two real-world conservation activities: 
town cleaning and maintenance of public water sources.  These activities are common 
practices among sample villages, where community members get together to clean 
common spaces and protect them from contamination by animals. The three 
dependent variables used in this study differ not only in the method used to collect 
them, but also in their relation to environmental conservation more specifically, rather 
than to social preferences and civic engagement more broadly.  
The paper is articulated as follows. First, we discuss the relevant literature on CPR 
management and review factors associated with more effective management systems 
(Section 2). We then give an overview of the study design, data, and empirical strategy 
(Section 3). We present and discuss the empirical results in Section 4 and 5, 
respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The common pool resource problem 
CPR are characterized by non-excludability and rivalry in consumption. The difficulty 
of excluding individuals from use, combined with the fact that consumption by one 
individual reduces the amount of resources available to others, imply that CPR users 
face a typical cooperation dilemma. Each individual depends on the resource for her 
livelihood and has the incentive to maximize her own benefit by increasing extraction. 
However, if everyone follows the same rationale, the resource will be depleted and will 
not generate benefits for anyone in the long term. In an influential article, Hardin 
(1968) claims that the behavior of rational, self-interested individuals is bound to 
result in overexploitation of CPR. This conclusion is consistent with game theoretical 
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predictions and is confirmed by numerous examples of overharvesting of renewable 
natural resources, such as fisheries, forests and groundwater. 
A large literature on CPR management questions this vision, by offering evidence of 
effective cooperation to solve commons problems. Field experiments show that 
collective action is most effective when communities are able to self-organize, and 
design and enforce their own rules (Wade, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1999; Baland and 
Platteau, 1996). Among factors influencing the effectiveness of CPR management is 
environmental degradation. The relationship between conservation and degradation is 
complex: while overexploitation of natural resources leads to environmental 
degradation, a certain degree of resource degradation is necessary to trigger collective 
action for conservation.  Among the different types of resource attributes that 
contribute to self-organized forest management, Elinor Ostrom (1999) underscores 
the importance of feasible improvement. Feasible improvement refers to a resource 
that is “not at a point of deterioration such that it is useless to organize or so 
underutilized that little advantage results from organizing” (Ostrom, 1999).  Empirical 
evidence shows that cooperation levels are low when the CPR is either abundant or 
extremely degraded, but high when the level of degradation is at a moderate level 
(Bardhan, 2000). 
Dependence on the CPR for a major portion of one’s livelihood is also claimed by 
Ostrom (1999) to be a factor leading to greater interest in conservation of the 
resource. Empirical evidence from Malawi shows that, where forests serve as safety 
nets for people, individuals have higher rates of participation in CPR management 
(Jumbe & Angelson, 2007). 
Social preferences, such as altruism, inequality aversion, trust, time preferences 
and civic engagement, are likely to affect CPR management since they shape 
individuals’ response to the trade-offs between individual and social benefits from 
environmental conservation.  Their role is bound to be particularly relevant in 
developing country settings, where social norms often substitute for formal 
institutions lacking regulatory and enforcement capacity (Narayan, 1999; Khan, 2006). 
The empirical evidence on the relationship between social preferences and 
environmental conservation widely supports this view (Goeree, Holt & Laury, 2002). 
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In particular, an individual’s level of altruism is likely to be positively correlated with 
her contribution to a local public good because an altruistic person’s utility is a 
positive function of others’ consumption. This view is in contrast with the traditional 
notion of self-interested individuals, whose utility depends solely on one’s own 
consumption (Becker, 1976; Reece, 1979; Collard, 1978).  
Preferences for fairness are also likely to foster sustainable management of CPR 
through their influence on people’s willingness to contribute to public goods and to 
punish over-exploitation by others. Direct evidence on the link between inequality 
aversion and public good contribution is scarce, but research in psychology (Lerner, 
1980; Bégue & Hafer, 2005) and economics (Andreoni, Harbaugh, & Vesterlund, 2003) 
shows that people express their preferences for fairness by punishing inequality in 
resource allocation.  
The literature on social capital and collective action identifies trust as a necessary 
condition for cooperation within a society (Ostrom, 1998; Cramb, 2005; Pretty, 2003; 
Pretty & Smith, 2004). Experimental studies show the presence of a positive 
correlation between trust towards strangers, contributions to public goods (Gächter, 
Herrmann, & Thöni, 2004) and other social preferences, such as fairness (Walker & 
Ostrom, 2007). Field evidence supports the results from laboratory experiments: 
combining data from a trust game with information on investments in soil and water 
conservation, Bouma et al. (2008) find a positive and significant correlation between 
the amount sent in the trust game and participation in CPR management.  
Investing in conservation involves a trade-off between short term costs and 
uncertain returns in the future. The degree to which individuals discount the future is 
therefore likely to affect the perceived benefits from contributing to natural resource 
conservation. The evidence on whether the poor discount the future more heavily, and 
on how discount rates translate into conservation activities, is mixed. In a three 
country study, Holden et al. (1998) find that poverty is associated with higher discount 
rates and lower conservation efforts. On the contrary, research based on food 
consumption and asset holding during famines shows that the poor reduce caloric 
intake during periods of food scarcity in order to avoid selling off productive assets 
(Moseley, 2001), suggesting the presence of a relatively low discount rate. Regardless 
6 
 
  
of the evidence on the relationship between poverty and time preferences, theory 
predicts a negative correlation between an individual’s discount rate and her 
environmental conservation efforts. 
Natural resources are a local public good, and their management requires collective 
action on the part of the community. Evidence from high-income countries shows that 
participation in city council and school meetings is associated with a higher probability 
of engaging in collective action for conservation (Wakefield, Elliott, & Cole, 2007). 
Membership in community associations is found to be associated with higher 
contribution to conservation projects in two artefactual field experiments in Latin 
America (d’Adda, 2011a; d’Adda, 2011b).  
While the evidence presented so far suggests a close relationship between social 
preferences and conservation behavior, Voors et al. (2011), in a paper representing the 
closest parallel to the research conducted here, show the complexity of such a 
relationship. Participants to their study play two public good games, a framed and an 
unframed one. Experimental choices are compared to survey data on illegal 
exploitation of forest resources and support for conservation activities. The main 
findings of the study are that behavior in the two experimental games is only weakly 
correlated, and that only positive contributions in the framed experiment are 
associated with higher conservation efforts outside of the experiment.  
More generally, the literature on environmental valuation presents many examples 
of the weak correlation between measures of environmental preferences and 
conservation behavior. Evidence from developed countries shows how environmental 
concerns influence conservation behavior only when it entails low costs and 
inconvenience for individuals (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 2003), and that there is a 
strong income elasticity of conservation behavior (Poortinga et al. 2004). Data from 
developing countries confirms these patterns, as revealed preference estimates of 
environmental valuations are lower than stated preferences estimates, and demand 
for a high quality environment is highly income elastic (Kremer et al., 2011). 
 
3.  Research Design and Empirical Strategy 
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In this section, we describe the area where the study took place (Section 3.1), and the 
main sources of data for the study (Section 3.2). We then focus on the experimental 
design (Section 3.3), and lastly, present the empirical strategy and the main variables 
used in the analysis (Section 3.4). 
 
3.1.Research area 
The study took place in Sierra Leone. The country has one of the lowest HDI rankings 
in the world – 158th out of 169 countries (Human Development Report, 2010) and 
experienced a devastating civil war between 1991 and 2002. Coupled with its high 
levels of poverty, the fact that Sierra Leone has suffered severe environmental 
degradation over the past thirty years makes it a suitable setting for our study. Figure 
1 shows that resource extraction in the country over the past decades has been 
steadily approaching the capacity of natural resources to regenerate themselves. This 
trend is likely to threaten the livelihood of 69% of the population who live in rural 
areas and directly depend on natural resources for their survival.1  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 2 shows the location of the study area is within the district of Bombali, 
where high rates of deforestation have been experienced, similar to the rest of the 
country as a whole.  The fact that people rely on natural resources for their livelihoods 
and are negatively affected by environmental problems emerges also by looking at our 
survey data: 90% of the participants in our study extract products from the forest, 
59% mention bush fires as an environmental problem in their village, and 69% report 
an increase in the price of firewood.  
 
 [Insert Figure 2] 
 
The experiment took place in 21 villages within Bombali district, with 560 
individuals between the ages of 18 and 84 participating in the study. The experiment 
                                                 
1 World Bank data, 2009. Link: data.worldbank.org/country/sierra-leone. 
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was part of a larger research project, investigating the relationship between conflict 
exposure and social preferences, and the transmission of preferences across 
generations. Consistent with these goals, the villages in our sample were selected on 
the basis of an index of exposure to civil war violence, and the experiment was 
conducted in primary schools with pupils and their parents. Only adult participants 
completed the task analyzed in the present paper. Therefore, in what follows, we will 
solely discuss the adult component of the study.2  
Table 1 summarizes characteristics of study participants. Many children in our 
sample were living with grandparents after their parents died due to the war, or 
moved to the city for work: this explains the relatively high average age of participants 
for a developing country. Only 26 percent of participants had some schooling, 75 
percent of them worked in agriculture, and their average weekly income per capita 
was about 49,000 Leones (less than 10 USD). The percentage of households that fled 
from their villages during the civil war is 87.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.2. Data 
The dataset used in the empirical analysis combines experimental, survey, and GIS 
data. The experimental design is described in detail in Section 3.3 below, while this 
sub-section focuses on the data collected through participants’ interviews and spatial 
analysis.  
The survey collected information on demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics, preferences, exposure to environmental degradation, and participation 
in environmental conservation activities and civic engagement. In what follows, we 
briefly describe the contents of the survey.3 
Socioeconomic characteristics include age, gender, marital status, education level, 
religion, ethnicity, occupation, household size, number of years living in the village, 
household per capita expenditure, and a series of questions on conflict exposure.  
                                                 
2
 For a detailed account of the broader research, within which the present study was set, of its design and results, see 
Bauer, Cassar, Chytilova and Henrich (2011). 
3 A complete overview of the survey questions is offered in Appendix B. 
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A set of questions concerned trust and time preferences. Our measure of trust is 
derived from a series of standard questions, taken from the World Value Survey. 
Respondents are asked to state their trust towards different groups of people: family 
members, friends, neighbors, and people in general. Trust variables range from one to 
three, where three represents the highest level of trust. A standard time preference 
question, facing respondents with six hypothetical situations where they had to choose 
between receiving a certain amount of money in the present or a larger sum in a 
month, is used to compute participants’ discount rate. The amount offered in the 
future ranged from 100,000 Leones (25 USD), equal to the amount offered in the 
present, up to 300,000 Leones. 
Exposure to environmental degradation is measured through questions on income 
lost due to factors related to the quality of the environment, either in the form of 
increased time to collect firewood or loss of harvest due to shocks.  We also collected a 
proxy of dependence on natural resources, given by the number of products that 
individuals extract from the forest, such as firewood, timber, fruits, honey, etc. 
Respondents’ conservation behavior was measured through two questions asking 
about participation in conservation activities: (1) subjects were asked whether they 
had participated in the maintenance of the main water source used by their household 
the last time it was performed, and (2) in cleaning the town over the previous year. 
These activities capture preferences towards conservation because environmental 
degradation represents a threat to the quality of water and to the village environment.  
Finally, a series of questions related to participation in community meetings, local 
and general elections, and membership in community associations. These activities all 
signal an individual’s involvement in public life.  
GIS data are used to derive measures of deforestation at the village level. Village 
level satellite observations of changes in forest cover between 2006 and 2010 were 
constructed based on NASA Landsat images and village GIS coordinates, obtained from 
the Community Forest Conservation and Agricultural Development Association of 
Sierra Leone.4  
                                                 
4
 The village level deforestation measure was constructed in ArcGIS from cloud free NASA Landsat images of Sierra 
Leone for the years 2006 and 2010.  These images had to be corrected for atmospheric scattering and absorption of 
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  Other village level characteristics were collected through a survey conducted 
with the village chief. This survey gathered information on population, distance to the 
nearest town; presence of health centers and daily markets, conflict intensity - proxied 
by the number of houses burnt in the village during the war- and indicators of living 
conditions in the village. 
 
3.3. Experimental design 
Participants to the experiment completed a series of tasks, designed to capture 
different dimensions of social preferences. Among others, participants played dictator 
and ultimatum games. 5 In both games, subjects could send between 0 and 4 tokens to 
an anonymous partner, in intervals of 1 token. Each token was worth 1,000 Leones 
(about 0.25 USD). In the ultimatum game, subjects made decisions both as senders and 
as receivers. Receivers in the ultimatum game used the strategy method: they had to 
decide, for each possible amount given by the sender, whether to accept the allocation 
or not. When a receiver didn’t accept the sender’s proposed allocation of tokens, 
neither party received anything. The order of tasks was randomized across sessions. 
The amount sent by subjects in these two games provide the experimental measures of 
social preferences that will be used in the empirical analysis. Details on variables’ 
definition are given in the next sub-section. 
After completing all the tasks, participants were asked whether they would like to 
donate a small part of their earnings to an environmental nonprofit organization called 
the Conservation Society of Sierra Leone (CSSL). CSSL is based in Freetown, and its 
main objective is ‘to promote the wise use and management of Sierra Leone’s natural 
resources through education, advocacy, research and site action’ (CSSL). Their 
                                                                                                                                                                  
light, which is based on the methodology that Chavez (1996) streamlined.  After these corrections were made, the soil 
adjusted vegetation index (SAVI) was calculated:   
 
SAVI=(N-R)/(N+R+L) (1+L)          
 
where N is the near-infrared band (Landsat TM Band 4); R is the red band (Landsat TM Band 3); and L is a correction 
factor between 0 and 1 (in this study, a mid-range value of L = 0.5 was used). The difference between the SAVI in 2006 
and 2010 was taken, and village GPS coordinates for 19 out of the 21 villages were manually added in ArcGIS.  A 2-
mile zone around each village was constructed, and the average level of vegetation cover decrease within each zone was 
used as the deforestation variable for that village. 
5
 Beside the dictator and ultimatum games, subjects played four binary-choice dictator games, taken from Bauer et al. 
(2011) and inspired by Fehr et al. (2008). Since data from these games are not used in the empirical analysis, we omit a 
detailed description, but refer the interested reader to Bauer et al. (2011). 
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programs range from sea turtle and forest conservation to environmental education 
and sensitization campaigns. Participants were given brief information about CSSL 
before being asked for a donation. 
Donations went to support non-rival and non-excludable conservation efforts. 
Under this respect, the experiment is similar to most public good games. However, our 
donation experiment differs from a public good game in a crucial dimension: the 
return from the investment in the public good is not exogenously given, but is subject 
to the same uncertainty that characterizes real world investments in common natural 
resources. This feature of our study, while generating a loss of experimental control, 
makes the experimental decision more generalizable and directly comparable to 
participants’ real world conservation choices. 
Participants could decide to donate 0, 300, 800 or 1000 Leones from their winnings 
to CSSL.6 The experimenter emphasized that the donation would be subtracted from 
their winnings from the day, that no other tasks would follow, and that contributions 
were completely voluntary.  Participants didn’t know how much they earned through 
the tasks at the time of choosing their donation, since they received their winnings 
only at the end of the experimental session, but had a sense of the magnitude of their 
final earnings relative to the possible donation amounts. Each participant was given 
what she earned for participation, plus what she earned for her choice in a randomly 
chosen task, minus her donation amount to CSSL. The participation fee was equal to 
5,000 Leones (about 1.25 USD). Although each task had different earnings potential, 
earnings from the games ranged between 0 and 16,000 Leones (about 4 USD).   
In order to test whether donation amounts depend on the perceived beneficiary of 
the service, we introduced an experimental treatment. CSSL’s activities were said to be 
beneficial for ‘people in the whole country’ in the out-group treatment, and for ‘people 
in this region’ in the in-group treatment. The allocation of treatment across sessions 
was random. We conducted two sessions in each village, in order to have observations 
for both treatments from each village. 
 
3.4. Analysis 
                                                 
6
 The price of a cup of rice, staple food in Sierra Leone, is 500 Leones. 
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In order to analyze the factors correlated with conservation behavior within the 
experiment, we run the following regression: 
 
Yij = α + βΖij + γXij + δVj + εij          (1) 
  
where the dependent variable Yij is donation amount, participation in water 
maintenance or in town cleaning. In our main specifications, we use ordered probit 
regressions for donation, and probit regressions for participation in conservation 
activities. In addition, we consider a dependent variable equal to 1 when an individual 
displays strong preferences for conservation along all three dimensions considered 
here; i.e. when an above-average amount is donated and participation has occurred in 
both conservation activities. Ζij is a vector of six variables, capturing the six correlates 
of conservation we focus on. Xij is a vector of individual and household level controls. Vj 
are village fixed-effects or village level characteristics. β and γ are coefficient vectors. 
The observations are clustered at the village level.7 In order to address concerns 
related to the use of fixed-effects in non-linear regression models, in what follows, we 
also present results of OLS regressions for each outcome variable. 
Our main outcome variables are different proxies of environmental valuation and 
conservation behavior. First, we use the amount donated to CSSL as our experimental 
measure of environmental valuation. The two conservation activities, considered here 
as outcome variables, capture subjects’ concern with the quality of the village’s water 
supply and common spaces.  
In the empirical analysis, we focus on six factors potentially correlated with 
conservation behavior: one of two versions of an index capturing exposure to 
environmental degradation and dependence on natural resources (henceforth 
exposure-dependence index), altruism, inequality aversion, trust, time preferences and 
civic engagement. In what follows, we describe each variable in turn. 
                                                 
7
 Assuming that village fixed-effects control for unobservable differences across villages and that observations from the 
same village are uncorrelated if individuals did not participate to the same experimental session, an alternative 
specification clusters the data at the session level. This specification, bringing the number of clusters from 21 to 42, also 
solves the issue of having too few clusters (Cameron and Miller, 2010). All the findings reported in this section are 
robust to the level of clustering chosen. 
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We adopt a subjective or an objective version of the exposure-dependence index in 
different specifications. The subjective version of the index proxies exposure to 
environmental degradation with a measure of experienced environmental 
degradation. This variable is equal to one if the respondent experienced increased 
firewood collection time or lost income due to an environmental shock over the two, 
or three, years prior to the survey, respectively. In order to combine exposure to 
degradation with dependence on natural resources, and thus test Elinor Ostrom’s 
claim that the combination of these two factors fosters conservation behavior, the 
environmental degradation variable is interacted with the number of products that 
individuals extract from the forest.  
Using subjective perceptions as a proxy of environmental degradation makes the 
establishment of any causal link between environmental degradation and donation 
questionable. Unobserved individual characteristics may determine both individuals’ 
awareness of environmental degradation and their willingness to contribute to 
conservation activities. For instance, it is likely that, for a given level of environmental 
quality, characteristics such as education, income and exposure to conservation 
campaigns may influence both the perception of environmental degradation and the 
willingness to support conservation activities. In order to address the issues 
associated with the use of experienced environmental degradation, we complement 
our subjective proxy of environmental degradation with more objective measures of 
deforestation.  
In the objective version of the exposure-dependence index, experienced 
environmental degradation is replaced with actual deforestation rates over the 5 years 
prior to the study. This approach guarantees that the environmental degradation 
variable used to construct the objective version of the index reflects more closely the 
effect of loss of forest cover on respondents’ exposure to environmental degradation. 
The use of actual deforestation, although addressing the issues related to the adoption 
of experienced degradation, also involves important shortcomings. While mining and 
illegal logging by foreign companies are major causes of deforestation in other regions 
of Sierra Leone, deforestation in this study area is primarily the result of firewood 
collection and slash-and-burn agriculture by local communities. It is possible that 
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present conservation choices are the product of common resources’ exploitation in the 
past, and unobservable individual preferences or characteristics lie behind both past 
deforestation and donation choices within the experiment. Therefore, the actual 
deforestation measure, while capturing individuals’ exposure to degradation, also 
reflects past preferences for conservation of village members. We will show in Section 
4 that this latter effect appears to dominate. 
Participants’ altruism and inequality aversion measures are derived from 
experimental data. We use the number of tokens sent in the dictator game as an 
ordered categorical proxy of altruism (Camerer, 2003). Inequality aversion is a 
variable equal to one if a participant equally split her endowment both in the 
ultimatum and in the dictator games.8  
Individual trust is captured by a trust index, defined as the ratio of personalized to 
generalized trust. The index is constructed by dividing the average trust towards 
family, friends and neighbors by the level of trust towards people in general, and can 
be interpreted as a measure of social capital within the village. Time preferences are 
summarized by the discount rate, constructed using the set of survey questions on 
trade-offs between present and future consumption. 
Subjects’ participation in community meetings, local and general elections and 
membership in community associations is used to derive an index of civic engagement. 
The index is constructed as follows: for each dimension of civic engagement, individual 
participation is divided by the average level of participation at the village level; the 
different dimensions are then summed to form a unique index.   
Regressions also control for individual and household characteristics, such as age, 
gender, marital status, education level, religion, ethnicity, occupation, household size, 
                                                 
8 Alternative measures of inequality aversions could be used. Combining choices in the four binary allocation games, 
Fehr et al (2008) construct an index of inequality aversion. We do not adopt this approach because only 9.6 percent of 
subjects (54 observations) can be defined as inequality averse based on their choices in the binary allocation games. A 
less demanding version of the inequality aversion proxy would require participants to split their tokens equally either in 
the ultimatum or in the dictator game. We prefer the stronger definition of egalitarianism used here because it identifies 
participants who consistently chose equal splits in the two tasks. However, the results reported in Section 4 are robust to 
the inequality aversion index used. 
15 
 
  
number of years living in the village, household per capita expenditure and an index of 
conflict exposure.9  
Table 2 shows summary statistics of the main outcome and control variables, and of 
the measures used to construct the environmental degradation and civic engagement 
indices. Average donation within our sample was about 550 Leones, and 82.7 percent 
of participants donated a positive amount to conservation. Turning to survey-based 
conservation measures, 58 and 50.4 percent of participants said to have taken part, 
respectively, in town cleaning and water source maintenance over the year prior to the 
survey. 68 percent of subjects experienced environmental degradation, in the form of 
increased firewood collection time or income loss due to shocks. On average, 1.41 
tokens were donated in the ultimatum game, and about 30.9 percent of participants 
can be defined as egalitarian according to the index constructed using behavior in the 
dictator and ultimatum games. The trust index, ranging from a minimum of 0.5 to a 
maximum of 3, is on average equal to 1.26 in our sample. The average discount is 66 
percent per month.10 Finally, the civic engagement index is normally distributed, with 
a mean of 4. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4. Results 
In this section, we investigate the factors behind environmental donation within the 
experiment, with a special focus on environmental degradation and social preferences. 
Following the discussion of Section 2, we expect the following correlations to hold: 
conservation behavior should be positively correlated with dependence on natural 
resources combined with experience of environmental degradation, altruism, 
inequality aversion, trust and civic engagement, while it should be decreasing in 
individuals’ discount rate.   
                                                 
9
 The conflict exposure index counts the number of ways in which respondents say to have been affected by the war. 
The list of conflict-related events considered in the survey ranged from having family members killed, injured or 
abducted, to having one’s house burned down, or having had to flee the village because of the war. 
10
 Almost 25 percent of participants always preferred to receive money in the present, regardless of how much was 
offered in the future. Since the discount rate is not defined for these individuals, we drop these observations from the 
regressions. 
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Figure 3 reports the percentage of subjects donating 0, 300, 800 or 1000 Leones 
overall (Panel A), depending on whether or not subjects participated in town cleaning 
and water maintenance; Panel B focuses on subjects who didn’t take part in either 
activity; Panel C on those who took part in either one activity or the other; and Panel D 
on those who took part in both. In all cases, the distribution of donation amount has a 
mode at 300 Leones. There is a positive correlation between donation and civic 
engagement: the percentage of subjects not donating anything is highest among the 
least engaged individuals and decreases as participation in community conservation 
activities increases. An opposite pattern can be observed for donations of 1000 Leones.   
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
The three measures of environmental conservation are positively correlated, 
although at differing levels of significance. The correlation is significant between town 
cleaning and water source maintenance (p = . 004), while it is not between donation 
and town cleaning (p = .720) nor between donation and water source maintenance (p 
= .383). These differences in pairwise correlation coefficients suggest that 
experimental and survey-based outcome variables capture different combinations of 
civic engagement, social preferences and environmental valuation. 
Table 3 shows regression results for the different specifications using donation as 
the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 3 report (ordered) probit results from 
equation (2), while 2 and 4 present the OLS results. The exposure-dependence index is 
constructed using experienced degradation in Columns 1 and 2, and actual 
deforestation in Columns 3 and 4. All regressions include village fixed-effects, since all 
of our regressors of interest, and in particular, the exposure-dependence index, vary at 
the individual level.  
  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Experienced environmental degradation is positively and significantly correlated 
with conservation behavior within the experiment. The sign and significance of the 
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coefficients on the exposure-dependence index is robust to the model used (probit 
versus OLS) under the first specification. These results support Elinor Ostrom’s claim 
on the effect of dependence and vulnerability to environmental shock being positively 
correlated with individual willingness to contribute to conservation activities. When 
actual deforestation rates are used to construct the index, the coefficient on exposure 
to degradation becomes insignificant.   
Among social preferences variables, indicators of altruism and inequality aversion 
are positively and significantly correlated with donation, as predicted by the theory. 
More pro-social play and egalitarian choices in the dictator and ultimatum games are 
associated with higher donations. Survey measures of social preferences, such as time 
preferences, trust and civic engagement, instead, show no significant correlation with 
the dependent variable. 
Table 4 shows results from similar specifications, with participation in water 
source maintenance (Columns 1 to 4) and participation in town cleaning (Columns 5 to 
8) as dependent variables. The regressions are run using both non-linear (Columns 1, 
3, 5 and 7) and linear (Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7) models. The exposure-dependence index 
is constructed using experienced degradation in Columns 1-2 and 5-6, and actual 
deforestation rates otherwise. The regressions feature, as above, individual controls 
and village fixed-effects.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Experienced environmental degradation is positively correlated with conservation 
choices outside the experiment, both with water source maintenance and town 
cleaning activities. On the contrary, when environmental degradation is measured 
through actual deforestation, its correlation with conservation behavior is negative 
and significant. Only a few social preference measures are correlated with 
conservation behavior outside the experiment. Individual discount rates are negatively 
and significantly correlated with participation in town cleaning, while higher trust 
levels translate in significantly higher participation in water source maintenance. None 
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of the experimental proxies of social preferences are correlated with the survey 
measured outcome variables.11 
Figure 4 shows the value of the three outcome variables for each value of the 
exposure-dependence index. The level of conservation activities grow as the index 
increases, though the pattern is less clear for donations. The graph confirms that 
experienced degradation has a consistent impact across conservation choices, but that 
there is a significant difference between experimental and survey-based measures of 
conservation. In general, these results suggest that, within each village, those 
individuals who are more vulnerable to environmental degradation are also more 
willing to contribute to the conservation of the environment and maintenance of the 
common resources. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
The different results obtained when focusing on experimental versus non-
experimental measures of environmental valuation may be explained, as discussed 
above, by the fact that the three outcome variables capture different combinations of 
social preferences related to the environment and more general ones. We thus derive 
the hypothesis that both types of variables will significantly explain all types of 
conservation behavior among those individuals who engage in all of them. In order to 
test this hypothesis, we construct a variable equal to 1 whenever an individual 
contributed an above-average amount in the experiment, and participated to both 
town cleaning and water maintenance.  
Table 5 reports regression results of the correlation between this indicator of 
strong preferences for conservation and the usual set of independent variables. The 
exposure-dependence index is constructed using experienced degradation in Column 
1, and actual deforestation in Column 2. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
                                                 
11
 The sign and significance of regression coefficients is confirmed even if we consider each regressor individually, as 
shown in Appendix tables A1-A3. 
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The results support our hypothesis and confirm our previous results. Exposure to 
environmental degradation has a positive effect on conservation when it captures 
experienced degradation, while it has a negative effect when it reflects past 
deforestation activities. Experimental measures of social preferences (altruism and 
inequality aversion) and survey-based measures of social preferences (trust) have a 
positive and significant effect on the probability of exhibiting strong preferences for 
conservation. When individual preferences for conservation are strong along all 
dimensions, experimental and survey based measures of various social preferences 
are significantly correlated with conservation behavior. Our results are closest to the 
theoretical predictions derived from the literature for individuals with strong 
preferences for conservation. 
Finally, we test whether donations differ depending on treatment assignment. No 
significant difference in average donation is observed12. This is confirmed by 
regression results reported in the Appendix (Table A4). There, we regress donation 
amount on interaction terms between each of the social preference independent 
variables and a dummy equal to 1 if a subject was assigned to the in-group treatment. 
Being told that the NGO’s activity will benefit people from one’s own region doesn’t 
increase donations: the coefficients on the in-group variable are generally insignificant 
and switch sign depending on the specification. None of the interaction terms are 
significant, implying that none of the dimensions of social preferences examined here 
lead to increased donations for conservation when the benefits are perceived to be 
directed to one’s own community. 
  
5. Discussion 
All the most often cited determinants of conservation behavior are explored in this 
study, and our main result is that the experience of environmental degradation in rural 
Sierra Leone makes individuals more likely to support conservation. Within each 
village, those most exposed to the consequences of deforestation are also more willing 
                                                 
12
 We run a Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the equality of distribution by treatment, which confirms the lack of 
significant differences between in-group and out-group (p = .285). 
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to contribute to conservation.  On the other hand, living within a village where 
deforestation was conducted is not by itself conducive to higher valuation of the 
environment. This result is probably due to the fact that the deforestation measure 
captures, besides exposure, the effect of low valuation of the environment in the past, 
which is likely to persist in the present and be among the determinants of individual 
current conservation behavior. The correlation between past and present low 
valuation of the environment may offset the positive effect of exposure to degradation 
on conservation choices. The issue of endogeneity does not only affect our measure of 
exposure based on deforestation. Experienced degradation may also suffer from 
endogeneity, since it may be correlated with individual characteristics that also 
influence conservation choices. 
Keeping these caveats in mind, the results on exposure to degradation are overall 
consistent with Elinor Ostrom’s claim that conservation behavior is fostered by a 
combination of worsening environmental conditions and dependence on natural 
resources.  And, furthermore, the results also show that living with the consequences 
of overexploitation of common resources is not enough to raise individual preferences 
for the environment.  
The findings of our study suggest that there is potential for sustainable natural 
resource use in an extremely poor, rural, and environmentally degraded setting.  We 
show that willingness to contribute to conservation may require awareness of the 
consequences of environmental degradation, and that this awareness is positively 
associated with conservation behavior.  We show this through our findings that 
perceived environmental degradation varies within villages even though actual 
degradation does not.  Environmental education, by disseminating information on the 
costs of environmental degradation, may therefore be effectively used to build support 
for locally-owned conservation initiatives, even in very poor settings. Since many 
development pathways are critically dependent upon the maintenance and 
exploitation of natural resources, this research is critical for policy makers seeking to 
manage developing countries’ resources. Consistent with these policy implications, the 
donations collected through our experiment were used by CSSL to offer environmental 
education across villages in the study area.  CSSL’s environmental campaign focused 
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on the consequences of bush fires, and procedures needed to minimize deforestation 
due to slash-and-burn agriculture.  
The second main result of this study is methodological. We observe lack of 
correlation between experimental and survey measures of conservation.  We find that, 
while donations are significantly correlated with experimental proxies of social 
preferences, they have no significant relationship with survey-based ones. In contrast, 
real-world conservation behavior is not explained by experimentally measured social 
preferences, but by survey-measured ones. The lack of correlation between 
experimental indices of social preferences and survey measures of conservation is 
consistent with psychology studies (Lee and Nisbett, 1991) and with Voors et al. 
(2011).  Consistent with previous literature is also our finding that more abstract 
measures of social preferences are unable to account for behavior in the real world, 
similar to the findings of Voors et al. (2011).  However, both types of measures are 
significantly correlated with conservation behavior when we define the latter as 
scoring high along both experimental and real world conservation decisions. Finally, 
also in contrast with Voors et al. (2011), we find survey-based measure of experienced 
environmental degradation to be significantly correlated with conservation behavior 
both within and outside the experiment.  
To reconcile these two sets of findings, it is important to note that, where a strong 
connection between experimental and real world decisions exists, as in the case of our 
donation task, behavior is consistent across realms. The lack of correlation between 
behavior within and outside the experiment is the result of experimental designs that 
do not closely reproduce real world decision environments. Indeed, the experiment we 
employed may be thought of as a modified version of a public goods game, where CSSL 
represents the environmental public good.  An important distinction of this modified 
version is that it more closely mirrors the real world, where the time of repayment and 
distribution to the public pool is unknown.  The experimental choice adopted in our 
study involved a loss of control relative to the use of standard public good games, but 
this cost was outweighed by the possibility of drawing policy lessons from our results.  
Our research informs policy makers that the generalizability of laboratory findings in a 
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field setting crucially relies on the experimental design mirroring real world 
conditions.   
 
6. Conclusions 
Using survey-based and experimental measures of conservation behavior and social 
preferences, this study investigates factors correlated with preferences for the 
environment. We find that, when dependence on natural resources is high, suffering 
the consequences of environmental degradation is positively correlated with both 
participants’ willingness to support environmental organizations and their likelihood 
of engaging in conservation activities. Simply living in areas which have experienced 
environmental degradation is not sufficient to raise people’s valuation of the 
environment. On the contrary, the weak preferences for conservation that have led to 
overexploitation of forest resources in the past appear to persist in current 
conservation choices. Experimental proxies of social preferences are correlated with 
donations, but not with actual conservation activities. The opposite holds for survey-
based measures of social preferences, which explain environmental valuation outside 
but not within the experiment.  
These findings are consistent with the existing literature on CPR management and 
social preferences. They also allow us to make a methodological point concerning the 
possibility to draw policy lessons from experimental findings: in order to generalize 
behavior from the laboratory to the field, experimental designs need to be carefully 
tailored to the decision setting and actual behavior one wishes to explain.  In our case, 
the results show the importance of environmental awareness in fostering conservation 
choices, and point to the role of environmental education messages explaining the 
costs of natural resource misuse.  
An interesting follow-up to this study would explore the effect of education 
campaigns on participants’ conservation behavior. In light of the findings from this 
study, environmental education programs are likely to have profound implications for 
the livelihood of individuals living in areas subject to natural resource depletion in 
developing countries. A second extension to this paper would address its main 
limitations, due to available measures of environmental degradation. In the future, we 
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plan to identify exogenous sources of environmental degradation within the study 
area, in order to explore the causal effect of environmental degradation on 
conservation behavior. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 1.  Ecological Footprint (red) and biocapacity (green) of Sierra Leone, 1961-
2007 
 
Note: The Ecological Footprint of production represents the rate of resource extraction and waste generation; 
biocapacity represents the rate of resource re-generation and waste sequestration.  A situation where the Ecological 
Footprint exceeds biocapacity indicates that domestic resources may be degraded.  Sierra Leone seems to be 
approaching this point, and may cross it within a few years if there are no conservation efforts (Ewing, Moore, 
Goldfinger, Oursler, Reed, & Wackernagel, 2010). 
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Figure 2.  GIS Maps of Forest Cover in Study Area: 1991, 2006 and 2010 
 
Note: Maps show the soil-adjusted vegetation index (SAVI): dark green areas represent the highest vegetation cover; red-
brown areas represent bare ground.  Source: NASA Landsat Program, 2010.  ETM+ and TM.  Bands 3 and 4. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of donations: frequency of donation amounts 
 
Note: Percentages reported. Panel a reports distribution of donation over all subjects, Panel b over  
subjects who did not participate in town cleaning or water maintenance, Panel c over subjects who  
participated in either of the two activities, Panel d over subjects who participated in both activities.  
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Figure 4. Exposure to environmental degradation-dependence on natural resources 
and on conservation choices 
 
Note: Donation amount expressed in thousands in order to use the same scale as for the water maintenance  
and town cleaning dummy variables.    
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 40.76 13.70 
Female .69 .46 
Married .79 .40 
Christian .34 .47 
Temne .65 .48 
Household size 9.01 4.38 
Attended school .26 .44 
Total weekly expenditure per capita (/000 
Leones) 49.46 59.25 
Owns land .77 .42 
Farmer .75 .43 
Years living in village 25.98 17.94 
Suffered from health shocks over the past year .49 .50 
Uses forest products .90 .29 
Time to collect firewood (in minutes) 89.04 52.21 
Thinks there are environmental problems .99 .07 
Forced to flee during war .87 .34 
Number of conflict-related events suffered 5.31 1.57 
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Table 2. Dependent variables and regressors of interest: summary statistics  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Conservation behavior     
Donation to CSSL 559.86 377.37 
Participated in water source maintenance over the previous year .59 .49 
Participated in road brushing over the previous year .60 .49 
Strong revealed preferences for conservationa .21 .41 
Perceived environmental degradation index and variables used to construct it 
Perceived environmental degradation index .68  .47 
Suffered from environmental shocks over the past 3 years .37 .48 
Time to collect firewood increased over past 2 years .37 .48 
Social preferences     
Ratio of personal to general trust 1.26 .51 
Discount rate 65.86 49.24 
Inequality averse .09 .29 
Strong egalitarian .31 .46 
Weak egalitarian .61 .49 
Dictator game giving (number of tokens sent) 1.41 1.22 
Ultimatum game giving (number of tokens sent) 1.78 1.00 
Civic engagement index and variables used to construct it     
Civic engagement index 4.00 1.08 
Number of community meetings attended over the previous year 5.77 4.46 
Member of Parents-Teachers group .71 .45 
Member of Village Development committee .22 .41 
Member of credit group .24 .43 
Member of labor sharing group .50 .50 
Member of social group .29 .45 
Member of religious group .51 .50 
Member of saving group .28 .45 
Member of traditional society .39 .49 
Voted in past general elections .97 .17 
Voted in past local elections .93 .26 
Note: a Defined as above-average donation amount, and participation in both town cleaning and road brushing
35 
 
  
Table 3. Determinants of donation amount 
 Dependent variable: Donation amount 
                 
Subjective 
exposure to 
degradation 
(oprobit) 
Subjective 
exposure to 
degradation 
(OLS) 
Objective 
exposure to 
degradation 
(oprobit) 
Objective 
exposure to 
degradation 
(OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exposure-dependence index  0.128** 37.410*   
(experienced degradation)                (0.056) (17.961)   
Exposure-dependence index    -1580.202 -6.36e+05 
(actual deforestation)                  (2535.690) (7.33e+05) 
Altruism 0.214*** 69.791*** 0.246*** 76.679*** 
                 (0.064) (18.525) (0.070) (19.451) 
Strong egalitarian 0.426*** 142.754*** 0.372** 138.888** 
                 (0.152) (47.688) (0.176) (54.037) 
Discount rate 0.001 0.122 0.001 0.155 
                 (0.001) (0.347) (0.001) (0.384) 
Personal to general trust  0.011 9.847 0.083 33.711 
ratio                 (0.134) (44.642) (0.143) (46.994) 
Civic engagement -0.059 -20.607 -0.051 -22.077 
                 (0.073) (23.228) (0.073) (20.092) 
Individual controls x x x x 
Village fixed-effects x x x x 
Observations 339 339 303 303 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.089 0.234 0.091 0.248 
Number of clusters 21 21 19 19 
Notes. Individual controls: ingroup treatment, age, gender, education, religion, marital status, ethnicity, household per 
capita expenditure, household size, number of years spent in the village. Observations clustered at the village level.
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Table 4. Determinants of conservation behavior 
  Dependent variable 
 
Water 
maintenance 
(probit) 
Water 
maintenance 
(OLS) 
Water 
maintenance 
(probit) 
Water 
maintenance 
(OLS) 
Townclean 
(probit) 
Townclean 
(OLS) 
Townclean 
(probit) 
Townclean 
(OLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Exposure-dependence 
index         0.317***        0.076***                                        0.392***        0.066***                                 
(experienced degradation)                (0.072)         (0.018)                                         (0.093)         (0.019)                                    
Exposure-dependence 
index                                     -1.16e+04***    -2437.858**                                     -1.92e+04***    -3073.957**  
(actual deforestation)                                                (3924.641)       (894.012)                                      (6347.065)      (1110.635)    
Altruism       -0.025          -0.004          -0.054          -0.010          -0.034          -0.001          -0.032           0.003    
                      (0.088)         (0.023)         (0.093)         (0.026)         (0.101)         (0.025)         (0.095)         (0.027)    
Strong egalitarian       -0.107          -0.018          -0.090          -0.023           0.206           0.044           0.142           0.026    
                      (0.198)         (0.055)         (0.192)         (0.052)         (0.217)         (0.046)         (0.213)         (0.054)    
Discount rate       -0.002          -0.001          -0.002          -0.001          -0.006***       -0.001**        -0.005**        -0.002**  
                      (0.002)         (0.000)         (0.002)         (0.001)         (0.002)         (0.001)         (0.002)         (0.001)    
Personal to general trust         1.052**         0.238***        1.086**         0.251***        0.212           0.063           0.315           0.083    
ratio                      (0.450)         (0.064)         (0.464)         (0.072)         (0.238)         (0.043)         (0.242)         (0.052)    
Civic engagement        0.052           0.015           0.119           0.037           0.256*          0.045           0.249           0.051    
                      (0.077)         (0.022)         (0.092)         (0.026)         (0.152)         (0.031)         (0.152)         (0.031)    
Individual controls x x x x x x x x 
Village fixed-effects x x x x x x x x 
Observations          337             337             301             301             338             338             302             302    
(Pseudo) R-squared        0.329           0.355           0.324           0.356           0.413           0.409           0.392           0.401    
Number of clusters           21              21              19              19              21              21              19              19    
Notes. Individual controls: ingroup treatment, age, gender, education, religion, marital status, ethnicity, household per capita expenditure, household size, number of years spent in the 
village. Observations clustered at the village level. 
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Table 5. Determinants of strong preferences for conservation 
                 Dependent variable 
                 Strong preferences for conservation 
  (1) (2) 
Exposure-dependence index  0.291***  
(experienced degradation)                (0.072)  
Exposure-dependence index   -1.58e+04*** 
(actual deforestation)                 (4960.660) 
Altruism 0.222** 0.213* 
                 (0.110) (0.126) 
Strong egalitarian 0.473** 0.651*** 
                 (0.197) (0.181) 
Discount rate 0.001 0.001 
                 (0.002) (0.002) 
Personal to general trust  0.641*** 0.783*** 
ratio                 (0.223) (0.244) 
Civic engagement 0.001 0.021 
                 (0.110) (0.114) 
Individual controls x x 
Village fixed-effects x x 
Observations 324 288 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.242 0.271 
Number of clusters 20 18 
Notes. GIS deforestation: village deforestation rate. Individual controls: ingroup treatment, age, gender, education, religion,  
marital status, ethnicity, household per capita expenditure, household size, number of years spent in the village.  
Observations clustered at the village level. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Social preferences and donation 
  Dependent variable: 
                 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
                 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure-dependence index  0.128**       
(experienced degradation)                (0.063)         
Altruism  0.191***     
                  (0.044)     
Strong egalitarian   0.468***    
                   (0.113)    
Discount rate    0.000   
                    (0.001)   
Personal to general trust ratio     0.025  
                     (0.105)  
Civic engagement      0.061 
                      (0.049) 
Individual controls x x x x x x 
Village fixed-effects x x x x x x 
Observations 516 548 553 414 553 540 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.038 0.047 0.045 0.039 0.032 0.033 
Number of clusters 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes. Individual controls: ingroup treatment, age, gender, education, religion, marital status, ethnicity, household per capita expenditure, household size, number  
of years spent in the village. Observations clustered at the village level. 
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Table A2. Social preferences and water source maintenance 
  Dependent variable: 
                 
Water 
maintenance 
(probit) 
Water 
maintenance 
(probit) 
Water 
maintenance 
(probit) 
Water 
maintenance 
(probit) 
Water 
maintenance 
(probit) 
Water 
maintenance 
(probit) 
                 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure-dependence index  0.724***      
(experienced degradation)                (0.140)      
Altruism  0.010     
                  (0.040)     
Strong egalitarian   0.048    
                   (0.146)    
Discount rate    -0.004**   
                    (0.001)   
Personal to general trust ratio     1.304***  
                     (0.334)  
Civic engagement      0.271*** 
                      (0.072) 
Individual controls x x x x x x 
Village fixed-effects x x x x x x 
Observations 515 545 552 413 552 539 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.190 0.149 0.148 0.156 0.249 0.174 
Number of clusters 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes. Individual controls: ingroup treatment, age, gender, education, religion, marital status, ethnicity, household per capita expenditure, household size, number  
of years spent in the village. Observations clustered at the village level. 
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Table A3. Social preferences and town cleaning 
  Dependent variable: 
                 
Townclean 
(probit) 
Townclean 
(probit) 
Townclean 
(probit) 
Townclean 
(probit) 
Townclean 
(probit) 
Townclean 
(probit) 
                 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure-dependence index  0.811***      
(experienced degradation)                (0.166)      
Altruism  0.061     
                  (0.065)     
Strong egalitarian   0.057    
                   (0.114)    
Discount rate    -0.006***   
                    (0.002)   
Personal to general trust ratio     0.707***  
                     (0.164)  
Civic engagement      0.367*** 
                      (0.092) 
Individual controls x x x x x x 
Village fixed-effects x x x x x x 
Observations 517 547 554 414 554 541 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.272 0.224 0.219 0.267 0.255 0.267 
Number of clusters 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes. Individual controls: ingroup treatment, age, gender, education, religion, marital status, ethnicity, household per capita expenditure, household size, number  
of years spent in the village. Observations clustered at the village level. 
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Table A4. Treatment effects 
  Dependent variable: 
                 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
Donation 
(oprobit) 
                 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ingroup* Exposure-dependence index  0.001        
(experienced degradation)                (0.233)        
Ingroup*Altruism  0.140       
                  (0.117)       
Ingroup*Strong elgalitarian   -0.131      
                   (0.341)      
Ingroup*Discount rate    -0.000     
                    (0.003)     
Ingroup*Personal to general trust      -0.179    
ratio                     (0.204)    
Ingroup*Civic engagement      -0.072   
                      (0.138)   
Ingroup*Years living in village       -0.000  
                       (0.006)  
Ingroup*War exposure        0.145 
                        (0.092) 
  
42 
 
  
Ingroup       -0.165          -0.351*         -0.123          -0.161           0.060           0.126          -0.153          -0.936*   
                      (0.244)         (0.213)         (0.193)         (0.239)         (0.265)         (0.573)         (0.238)         (0.507)    
Environmental degradation 0.411**  0.407**  0.410*** 0.411*** 0.403*** 0.412*** 0.410***  0.412*** 
                      (0.192)         (0.159)         (0.158)         (0.158)         (0.155)         (0.160)         (0.159)         (0.156)    
Altruism 0.219*** 0.141    0.218*** 0.219*** 0.222*** 0.218*** 0.220*** 0.221*** 
                      (0.056)         (0.096)         (0.058)         (0.058)         (0.057)         (0.056)         (0.055)         (0.058)    
Strong egalitarian 0.400*** 0.417***        0.468*     0.400**   0.399*** 0.411***  0.401***    0.378**  
                      (0.153)         (0.159)         (0.249)         (0.156)         (0.154)         (0.158)         (0.154)         (0.149)    
Discount rate        0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000    
                      (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)    
Personal to general trust ratio       -0.094          -0.094          -0.095          -0.094           0.002          -0.101          -0.094          -0.084    
                      (0.143)         (0.142)         (0.144)         (0.140)         (0.158)         (0.142)         (0.143)         (0.143)    
Civic engagement        0.013           0.012           0.017           0.013           0.009           0.049           0.013           0.009    
                      (0.063)         (0.061)         (0.064)         (0.063)         (0.065)         (0.086)         (0.062)         (0.062)    
Individual controls x x x x x x x x 
Village fixed-effects x x x x x x x x 
Observations          370             370             370             370             370             370             370             370    
(Pseudo) R-squared        0.088           0.090           0.088           0.088           0.088           0.088           0.088           0.091    
Number of clusters           21              21              21              21              21              21              21              21    
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Appendix B. Variable description 
Variable Type Descritpion 
Donation 
Ordered 
Response  
Amount donated to CSSL: 0, 300, 800, or 
1000 Leones 
WaterMaintenance Dummy 
Equal to 1 if answer to the following 
question = Yes: 
Did you contribute last time this water 
source (the one your HH uses) needed 
maintenance? 
Townclean Dummy 
Equal to 1 if answer to the following 
question = Yes: 
Have  you participated in road brushing 
or town cleaning in the past year? 
Strong preferences for 
conservation 
Dummy 
Equal to 1 if: 
- Amount donated to CSSL>average 
amount donated to CSSL by all 
participants 
- WaterMaintenance = 1 
- Townclean = 1 
Firewood time 
increased 
Dummy 
Equal to 1 if answer to the following 
question = Increased: 
Has the time it takes to collect firewood 
increased/decreased over the last 2 
years?  
Environmental shocks Dummy 
Equal to 1 if answer to the following 
question = Yes: 
In the past 3 years, have you lost any 
income due to flooding, draught, water 
contamination, pollution or other 
environmental shocks? 
Environmental 
Degradation 
Dummy 
Equal to 1 if Firewood time increased = 
1 or Environmental shocks = 1 
Altruism 
Ordered 
Response 
Number of tokens sent in Dictator game: 
0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 
Strong egalitarian Dummy 
Equal to 1 if tokens sent in Dictator 
game = 2 AND tokens sent in Ultimatum 
game = 2 
Discount rate 
Ordered 
Response 
Equal to 0, 20, 50, 100, 150 or 200 
depending on answers to the following 
series of questions: 
Imagine you have won the lottery. You 
can choose between being paid today or 
a different amount in a month. Which 
option do you prefer? Imagine that you 
are certain that the money will come for 
sure in one month. 
100,000 Le today or 100,000 in one 
month 
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100,000 Le today or 150,000 in one 
month 
100,000 Le today or 200,000 in one 
month 
100,000 Le today or 250,000 in one 
month 
100,000 Le today or 300,000 in one 
month 
 
 
